Surface water irrigators in arid regions confront public good issues for building and maintaining shared infrastructure as well as common-pool resource issues to appropriate the surface water. Drawing on the unique history of New Mexico, I explore how the transition in the early 20 th century from the original small decentralized communal Spanish irrigation systems (acequias) to centralized quasi-public irrigation districts altered agricultural development and production. My results confirm that that irrigation districts can significantly improve outcomes when investing in costly infrastructure to expand irrigated acreage, increasing farmland values up to 33 percent. However, I find no broader evidence that the centralized control of water distribution provides any gains to acreage previously under irrigation by the decentralized acequias.
INTRODUCTION
Irrigation water is of great value for farmers cultivating land in the arid regions. Due to the elusive flow of water and disparities between the optimal sizes for farms and irrigation enterprises (Bretsen and Hill 2006) , the endeavor requires coordination among irrigators to avoid the pitfalls of misaligned incentives that can lead to a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968 ).
In particular, the need for shared infrastructure, whether physical or institutional, creates a public good problem prone to free-riding while water's fugitive nature makes it costly to define property rights to provide exclusion, leading to issues of over-appropriation. Plenty of evidence exists that communities, most often small and homogenous, can cooperate and develop a mix of trust and rules that staves off the tragedy of commons (Ostrom 1990) . But even where irrigators are similar along all other dimensions, biophysical differences, including spatial distribution on a stream or canal, creates heterogeneity. Upstream irrigators, for example, can more readily appropriate additional water and shirk canal investment and maintenance. This relationship can also impede voluntary cooperation to achieve efficient and equitable allocation of the water as has been found in Kenya and India (McCord et al. 2017; Ray and Williams 2002) .
Centralized government control can avoid numerous bargains and even more numerous opportunities to shirk any resulting agreements, but centralized decision-making is not without its own problems (Coase 1960; Hayek 1945) . Many government-ran systems in developing countries perform poorly (Suhardiman and Giordano 2014; Adams 1990; Ostrom and Gardner 1993) . For example, larger government systems often impose simple and inflexible rules, resulting in inefficient and inequitable benefits accruing to the irrigators (Ferguson 1992) . In other instances the governments presence may erode the irrigators' willingness to collectively engage in other needed maintenance efforts (Lam 1996) . Still, current efforts to move from centralized organization to decentralized natural resource management offers only mixed success (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2006; Larson and Soto 2008; Nagrah, Chaudhry, and Giordano 2016; Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002) and it remains important to study past examples of drastic shifts in resource governance structure to better understand how the resource and the local users may be impacted by the nexus and mode of decision making.
Because of its aridity, development of the American West, delineated by the 100 th meridian, dealt with similar irrigation challenges. Throughout the 19 th and 20 th century a number of farmers and policymakers attempted to overcome these obstacles and develop irrigation through various laws and organization forms with mixed success. 1 R. H. Whitbeck, (1919) echoes this sentiment stating Western irrigation was neither a success nor failure, highlighting the 55,000 some nonfederal projects -communal ditches, incorporated and unincorporated mutual companies, and commercial companies -as successful but the US Bureau of Reclamation projects struggling at the time. However, with greater hindsight it appears that Irrigation Districts (henceforth "IDs"), often in tandem with the Bureau of Reclamation, created significant irrigation growth compared to other irrigation organizations in the latter portion of the 20 th century (Bretsen and Hill 2006) .
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Their attractiveness and success of these quasi-public government entities has been attributed to their institutional innovation to overcome free riding and accumulate external capital-reducing a number of transaction costs (Bretsen and Hill 2006; Hutchins 1931; Leshy 1982; Libecap 2011) . While the 17 Western states expanded irrigated acreage by an average of 1 percent annually from 1910 to 1978, ID acreage in particular grew by 4 percent annually-adding some 10,000,000 irrigated acres.
In this article, I assess the impact IDs have on agricultural development and production in New Mexico. The choice of New Mexico lies in its unique history among the Western States.
Long before Anglo-Americans sought to irrigate the West, Spanish settlers colonized this region.
No less dependent on irrigation than later settlers, they established irrigation beginning around 1600, some 240 years prior to the Mormons irrigating the soils of Utah. The Spaniards success stemmed from their transplantation of their communal acequia systems developed in the arid regions of Spain and many remain today serving as counter-examples to the oft-prescribed tragedy of the commons (Cox 2014; Smith 2016) . However, successful avoidance of the "tragedy" is not indicative of efficiency or optimality. In fact the US found the systems lackluster, stating of New Mexican farmers in 1890, "The average small farmer, especially of Spanish […] descent, has shown little energy or skill, and as a consequence the returns have been small" (US Census Office, 1894, p. 193) . Following an overhaul of irrigation legislation in the 1 A fundamental shift in water law during the 19 th century was the rejection of the Riparian Doctrine and the adoption of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine in the 17 Western States. The former defines correlative water rights to landowners abutting a body of water and is used in the more humid east. The latter provides absolute rights independent of land location based on first-come-first-serve. Designed to and able to safeguard investment (Leonard and Libecap 2016) , the doctrine introduces some economic inefficiencies in the division of water (Burness and Quirk 1979; Smith 2014) . With deeper Spanish roots, New Mexico itself was (and is) slow to adopt and implement this law. The focus of this paper, however, is on organizational form and not the use of prior appropriation. 2 Though popular, they were not universally successful; from 1890-1928, the number of districts formed in the US grew from just 17 to 801, though by 1928 nearly 300 were inactive (Hutchins 1931). early 20 th century, IDs formed within New Mexico, compelling a number of acequias to join the larger entities. Many of the 1400 historic acequias have been subsumed by one of the 14 IDs throughout the state, though over 700 acequias remain. This historic analysis provides a new perspective to the current irrigation development debate by considering a process of centralization rather than decentralization.
Not only do IDs possess governmental authority to tax, they often centralize decision power as well. Often quite large, IDs are able to internalize externalities in water appropriation along a stream as they often control multiple diversion points and provide many irrigators with water.
Because many IDs own the appropriative water rights (Hutchins, Selby, and Voelker 1953) I use New Mexico's partial transition to address three related questions. First, because the choice is not random, who is more likely to adopt an ID? Second, and most directly, how did the transition to IDs impact the agricultural economy of New Mexico? Because the motivation to adopt IDs (at least from legislative records) was economic growth, it is important to understand if IDs delivered. And third, taking advantage of the pre-existing irrigation, I assess whether IDs improve on the intensive margin rather than just the extensive margin. Often the success of IDs is attributable to their expansion of irrigated acres and improvement of infrastructure-the public good issues. This last question assesses whether a change in organization, from many decentralized systems to a larger centralized system, improves upon the common-pool resource issue of efficient division of the resource for those already irrigating.
The first question, concerning who in New Mexico is more likely to adopt an ID, is assessed from a theoretical standpoint, considering the organization differences and those facing the largest transaction costs. Both social and biophysical factors matter. The theory is then tested using 1910 US Agricultural and Irrigation Census data at the county level and provides important background information. To address the second two questions, counties that make the transition possible to extract funds in order to invest in large infrastructure, providing a mechanism by which farmers can engage in larger irrigation projects by compelling dissenting minorities to pay (Hutchins 1931; Leshy 1982) . 6 Furthermore, they have the ability to issue (tax-exempt) bonds, providing a mechanism to take on debt for such projects. Ultimately these legal powers led the Bureau of Reclamation to prefer contracting directly and exclusively with IDs. 7 Indeed, while early districts were formed to secure internal financing through assessments, later districts often formed to secure external financing through bonds (Leshy 1982) . Overall, they served to reduce many transaction costs confronted by irrigation projects (Bretsen and Hill 2006; Libecap 2011; Carey and Sunding 2001) .
Irrigators in New Mexico adopted IDs quickly. centralized to district officials in Albuquerque (J. A. Rivera, 1998, p. 215) . In total, the evidence supports that, in New Mexico, IDs often marked a change towards a centralized public governance structure by supplanting and combining the previously independent communal ditches rather than developing new systems.
Additional qualitative evidence suggests the change was not always welcome. 
Distinctions between Irrigation Enterprises
The old acequias and newer IDs are organized substantially different from one another, though both ultimately aim to deliver water to irrigators. The differences stem from the statutory distinctions of their legal authority. To quantify the differences between the organizations, I
present data from the 1950 Irrigation Census (US Bureau of the Census, 1952, p. 12-5, State Table 3 summarizes the designed differences based on the institutional structure and also presents what may be seen as outcomes, though, the static nature of the data precludes any causal inferences.
Infrastructure
Acequias do not have the power of inclusion, they cannot tax, and they cannot issue debt, making it difficult to finance large cash expenditures. Instead, acequias rely on savings and individual contributions, often in the form of sweat equity rather than cash. This is the most marked financial advantage the IDs have over acequias (GS7) (Hutchins 1931; Leshy 1982) . The ability to raise capital both internally and externally results in advantageous infrastructure financing. With the ability to tax all users in a large area, they tended to undergo projects that altered the resource system beyond the capability of smaller local organizations (Wozniak 1997) .
Often, canals were expanded, head gates upgraded to concrete structures, and dams constructed for both flood control and storage (RS4 and RS8), providing more predictability of the system (RS7). With larger storage capacity, the irrigated land within IDs had access to more stored reserves. Diversion structures were more likely to be constructed out of concrete. These improvements were not without their own issues, as the districts often struggled to maintain the expanded infrastructure, raising fees often (Wozniak 1997) .
Management
Often trying to garner economies of scale, IDs tend to be much larger than acequia systems (RS3). This drastically increases the number of users (U1), often being magnitudes larger.
Arguably, the larger boundaries resulted in clearer system boundaries by including a number of diversion points on a single stream previously operating independently. The decision process is more centralized with the member-to-board member ratio much larger among the IDs.
Water Delivery
Whether due to natural supply advantages, infrastructure improvements, or more efficient delivery systems, IDs delivered nearly twice as much water per acre than communal acequias as of 1950 (RS5). Division of that water differs as well (GS5). For acequia farmers, delivery is almost always done on a rotational basis in which they receive the full flow for a given amount of time. Amongst acequias on the same river, either priority or some sharing agreement divides inter-acequia water use. The latter -sharing agreements -are more common because the water rights pre-date US sovereignty meaning: 1) it is difficult to establish accurate historical diversion dates and 2) the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo committed to respect existing property rights.
Accordingly, many of the independent acequias throughout New Mexico have agreed to forego the Anglo priority system during adjudication processes (Richards 2008). This yields a decentralized administration and self-monitoring of water division. In contrast, water division in IDs is administratively determined. In practice, irrigators often place an order for water and then it is delivered as soon as hydrologically possible, often simultaneously with other farmers.
Whereas acequias are often defined by single diversion point, IDs oversee multiple diversion points, providing internal management and monitoring across them. Any flouting of the division rules across diversion points are more readily enforced within IDs than across acequias as IDs have the authority to levy fines, which if unpaid, can result in a lien on the associated land (GS8).
ADOPTING IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The main analysis draws on the facts that 14 IDs identified in Table 1 Because ID adoption is not random, it is important to consider where and by who they are more likely to be adopted. Ultimately the decision to form an ID falls to eligible voters within the proposed borders usually requiring a majority to approve the ID, though this can vary and the votes may be counted on an acreage basis. In theory, the decision should driven by the expected net gains of internalizing decisions compared to the current transaction costs of decentralized management (Coase 1937; Libecap 1993) . Those subject to larger externalities and/or facing greater transaction costs to cooperatively address the externalities should favor reorganizing as an ID. For instance, the potential gains may be driven by the existing extent of irrigation, though not in an unambiguous way. On the one hand, if the shared infrastructure is the primary issue, than areas with less development -emblematic of their inability to overcome the public goods issue -should favor the adoption of an ID. On the other hand, where irrigation is more developed and water division is problematic, IDs might be favored to address the common-pool resource issues.
Of course centralized control is not necessary to address CPR and public good issues: As an illustration of the Coasean bargaining in action, many of the decentralized acequias have addressed the issues by negotiating agreements. Negotiation and cooperation are predicted to become increasingly difficult with more users in general (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; R. H. Coase 1960) and this is empirically true for acequias (Smith 2016). For provision of public goods, free riding incentives are exasperated by an increased number of beneficiaries. Therefore, one would expect counties with more farmers to have greater desire to form an ID, though this should be qualified at the county level: Irrigators are only impacted by those who share a water source.
Having more creeks reduces the need to organize into a centrally managed regime, as the resource itself is geographically separated. Beyond the cooperative dynamic of physical connection, the gains of infrastructure improvements are larger where water is more centralized, meaning counties with more disperse surface water is also less attractive for the type of storage projects IDs may be well-suited to build.
To the extent that IDs were expected to successfully mediate the CPR and public good issues, areas with other favorable factors of production would stand to gain more. For instance, areas with good soil and topography suitable for crops would more likely adopt IDs. Greater non-farm populations may also increase the proclivity to favor IDs in at least two ways. First, more people would mean greater access to labor and a larger market for the farm produce.
Second, because IDs are able to tax all those who benefit, which can easily be defined to include non-irrigators benefitting from flood control, irrigators may be able to subsidize their needs, especially when voting is quantified on a per-acre basis.
Empirical Support
Using time-invariant physical data and data from the 1910 Census, the above predictions are tested empirically at the county level in New Mexico. Given the even mix of treatment (13 non-district to 13 district counties), the use of the linear 15 The data used is more fully described below in the data section.
model can be expected to perform well, though alternative logit results are also provided in columns (3) and (4). 16 Specifically, I estimate: two results indicate that when many irrigating farmers are currently irrigating relatively few acres, they see an opportunity to expand and the ID can overcome the externalities. The fraction of farm acreage in the county increases the odds, as this increases the set of beneficiaries.
The remaining factors are not statistically significant. Importantly, the land valuation in 1910 does not serve as a good predictor. I provide additional evidence, but this supports ID formation as exogenous to the primary outcome considered below. The total population is imprecise providing no evidence of large farms capable of adopting IDs to compel non-farmers to pay. The number of historic acequias also provides little predictive power. The empirical result is not surprising; more acequias indicate more irrigation but possibly more opposition to alternative irrigation organizations. Finally, geographic position (general north/south and east/west position) offers no additional predictive power.
DATA AND METHODS

Data
To test the impact of IDs in New Mexico, I utilize agricultural outcomes gathered from the publicly available records of the US Irrigation and Agricultural Censuses from 16 The alternative logit model is qualitatively similar but limited in the number of regressors included due to the small sample and statistical methodology. It predicts 84.62% of the observations correctly as seen in Tables A1-A3 .
Method: County Level Difference-in-Differences
The main analysis tool is a hedonic valuation utilizing a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework at the county level to leverage the quasi-experiment. The specification is as follows:
In the specification above, subscript refers to the county and refers to the year.
The primary outcome ( @Y ) considered is the logged farm value per acre. 20 The methodology follows a number hedonic value studies, relying on a related market to back out the value put on a component that does not have a market itself. With the inclusion of numerous other variables that likely affect agriculture land value, the remaining portion is attributed to the presence of the ID. The method has been applied to agriculture land for water rights (Crouter 1987; Faux and Perry 1999; Petrie and Taylor 2007) , groundwater access (Hornbeck and Keskin 2014) , and groundwater heterogeneity (Edwards 2016). I also consider crop value sold, irrigated acreage, irrigation costs, debt levels, and tenancy rates. The measure of debt pertains to the farms themselves, not the irrigation organization.
A is the coefficient of interest, capturing the impact of the interaction term, @Y , indicating the county has a district formed. Rather than a discrete indicator variable, I utilize a continuous treatment measure based on the fraction of irrigated acres by the districts in the county compared to the total number of acres in farms. IDs never encompass an entire county or even the farmland, let alone all the irrigated land, causing a simple indicator variable to drastically overstate the extent of treatment at the county level. In the cases where a county has numerous IDs, the continuous measure is also able to capture the increase in treatment as the ID acreage increases over time. Acreage assigned to each ID in each county is taken from numerous sources, summarized in Table A2 . Because IDs may impact farm acreage, I use the maximum observed farm acreage as the denominator.
21 On average, for counties that have IDs, 1.43 percent of farmland is treated. 22 Though some irrigators are compelled against their wishes to be part of an ID, as discussed above the overall adoption is not random. Accordingly, I interpret the estimated coefficients only as the treatment-on-treated effects.
@ is a dummy as to whether the county received an ID or will do so in a later period.
Y represents a series of dummy variables for the various census years, capturing macro shocks: crop prices, inflation, available technology, and general weather conditions. are county level controls and coefficients that may impact agricultural outcomes that do not vary over the sample period. These include soil quality, elevation, ruggedness, longitude and latitude, and proximity to railroads and major interstates. In addition, the presence of an aquifer within a county is included with an interaction term for observations after 1940 to account for the expanded and valuable use of groundwater in Western agriculture (Edwards and Smith 2016).
Because the number of creeks is an important factor in predicting where IDs form, I also include this measure as a covariate. @Y contains variables that change over time and their coefficients.
This includes general population, which may impact land scarcity and provide farmers with greater access to local markets. It also includes average precipitation over the prior 10 years.
Conducting historic, county level analysis in the Western United States presents issues due to shifting borders of counties as more were added. Today New Mexico boasts 33 counties, but as of 1900 the same geographic area was divided into only 19 counties. Much of the dynamic 21 In robustness checks I have also scaled the variables by current farm acreage and total county acres. 22 As a fraction of irrigated land in a county, the ID acreage is relatively more substantial with a mean of 58 percent for ID counties. With outcomes primarily reported for all farm acreage in the county, using farm acreage as the denominator remains a more appropriate measure of treatment.
process ended by 1925, but many IDs formed prior to this time. 23 The main analysis is based on the 26 counties as drawn in 1910 and shown in Figure 2 . As commonly done, the census data from other years are reweighted to reflect these borders (e.g. Hansen, Libecap, & Lowe, 2009 ).
In instances of a county being divided in two, the process is clearly valid. When two counties become three, the validity rests upon the assumption that the agricultural data is uniformly distributed geographically. A somewhat tenuous assumption given the size of counties and clumping of agriculture near streams, a series of robustness checks considers alternative county aggregations.
Difference-in-Difference Assumptions
In order for estimates of A to have a causal interpretation, it is necessary to satisfy the assumption that the two sets of counties, those with and those without districts, would have Quay eventually formed an ID. Therefore, in this setting, it seems reasonable that absent the intervention of IDs, both types of counties would have continued to govern irrigation through the culturally embedded acequias. As documented by Calkins (1936) and Rivera (1998) Tables A5 and A6 . In short, across the six outcomes, none of the interaction terms are statistically significant other than for irrigation costs per acre and the evidence suggests that these costs were actually rising more substantially for non-ID counties. With no distinguishable difference in pre-treatment trends, save for irrigation costs, the different counties could be expected to continue to share a trend absent intervention.
RESULTS
Did IDs provide substantial economic growth in New Mexico's agricultural sector? The answer is both yes and no. In Table 6 , I present the coefficients on the ID variables of interest from estimating equations (2) 
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The gains can be linked the large gain in yields. On average, ID counties gain, when scaled appropriately in Table 7 , 82.7 percent in the per farm acre market value of crops. Given the advantages to irrigated production mentioned in the 1910 census, the jump in productivity is not surprising. And to the extent water was being delivered to previously non-irrigated land, 82 percent may be reasonable. Fixed-effect regressions find only a 14.8 percent increase in market value of crops. The large difference in magnitude between the models is no doubt related to the relative increases of the fraction irrigated estimated by the two models. With no fixed effects, IDs nearly doubled the fraction of irrigated acreage, which would align well with large percentage increases in crop production. The expansion of irrigated acreage is again more muted with the inclusion of fixed effects. Though the magnitudes of all the outcomes are significantly different enough across the models to warrant consideration as to which one is more appropriate, I forego that discussion to focus on a more important point: the results, regardless of fixed effects, are driven solely by EBID in Dona Ana County, largely due to its success in expanding irrigated acreage. EBID accounts for the large uptick in irrigated acreage by IDs shown in Figure 1 from 1910 to 1920.
When excluding that acreage, the growth of 136,000 ID irrigated acres from 1910 to 1959 was 25 Robustness checks provided in the Appendix (Tables A7) show that the results are unlikely driven by omitted variables influencing the local economies more generally as there is no statistically significant effects on manufacturing output nor residential values and rental rates. The results are also robust to alternative ways to scale ID treatment as well as alternative ways to reweight census data to account for changing county borders (Table A8 ).
almost completely offset by the loss of 117,000 acres irrigated by communal systems, more clearly isolating a change of governance from communal irrigation systems (shown in Figure A1 of the Appendix). Accordingly, I re-estimate equation (2) without Dona Ana and present the coefficients estimates in Table 8 . The only statistically significant effect found is that irrigation costs are driven up by IDs, but with none of the other upsides in production or overall value. In general, the point estimates on the other outcomes not only become statistically indistinguishable from zero, but also are smaller in magnitude or even negative in some cases. Therefore there is little evidence that the average effect found with the complete set of counties is representative of the median effect. Table A9 in the Appendix). In addition, the increase supply and security of water for irrigation (in combination with the increased costs) led 26 This calculation was done by backing out the average percent gain calculated in Table 7 from the observed value in each ID county each year ( @Y − ( @Y 1.115)) and then aggregating each year over all the treated counties. 1940 was chosen because all ID counties were treated at that point in time and to provide a fairer comparison to groundwater development. many irrigators to switch to cash crops, primarily cotton (Calkins 1936; Autobee 1994 27 The $100.71 is low as it reflects total value divided by all farm acreage while the subsidy is only per EBID acre.
Average land values for only land served by the EBID would undoubtedly be higher. 28 Though free of public good issues for infrastructure, groundwater irrigators are increasingly confronting commonpool issues owing to their shared water source. Water levels for the portion of the Ogallala aquifer in New Mexico generally dropped from 20 feet below the surface to 80 feet below (Woodward 1997) . 29 In 1964, Curry County irrigated 116,125 acres (12.7 percent) while Dona Ana irrigated 91,680 (10.8 percent). 30 More generally, groundwater access explains the lion share of the growth in agricultural production in the entirety of the West post-1940 while the more costly surface water infrastructure provided just 6% of the growth (Edwards and Smith 2017). 31 In unreported regressions of equation (2), I also found statistical evidence that hired labor expenditures increased dramatically in ID counties, but again, driven by Dona Ana.
occurred within the EBID. 32 For Hispanic farmers it seems the IDs either improved crop production and land values but they were forced off the land or they were able to stay where the IDs did little to improve outcomes.
The lack of agricultural benefits in New Mexico from centralizing control of irrigation water found here might be due to a number of factors. First, it is possible centralized control would improve outcomes but IDs failed to reach the appropriate scale to address the externalities. The EBID, where benefits were found, stands out as the largest ID and could explain some of the gains beyond the infrastructure investments. But this seems unlikely as other IDs are also often large in absolute terms -the MRGCD covers over 50,000 acres and Carlsbad ID accounts for 25,000 acres -and just as large in relative terms; the EBID covers 86 percent of the maximum Third, the acequias system of repartiemento and reliance on trust and reciprocity for the division of water may have already sufficiently overcome the externalities, leaving little to gain from centralized management. Acequias have been widely cited for their successful collective 32 The EBID are not entirely unique and the regression results only suggest their was no effect on average. Evidence remains that some MRGCD irrigators experienced similar dispossession of their land: Frank Wozniak (1997) reports that 90 percent of the MRGCD lands were delinquent on payments and nearly a third of the irrigable land was confiscated by the state during the 1940s. Though delinquency rates among Hispanic and Anglo farmers were similar, at least as of Calkin's 1936 study (p. 86, Table XIV) action and avoidance of the tragedy of the commons (Cox & Ross, 2011; Rivera, 1998; Rodríguez, 2006; Smith, 2016) . There is even evidence that New Mexico acequias and their allowance to circumvent prior appropriations to continue repartiemento, have significantly higher marginal returns to surface water than similar acequias in Southern Colorado that are subject to Colorado's priority system (Smith 2014).
It is worth considering whether New Mexico's experience with IDs could be construed more generally as the West's experience with IDs. In contracting with the Bureau of Reclamation and investing in large infrastructure, the answer is probably yes and IDs were necessary to bring more acreage under production after 1900. And where they succeeded, undoubtedly the local farms and broader economy improved. However, the investment was not always successful.
While the EBID has thrived, the nearby Hondo Project in Chaves County was an early Bureau of Reclamation debacle, completely abandoned by 1916 (Rae and Baker 1971) . By 1928, 302 of the 801 IDs in the US were no longer active (Hutchins 1931 (Hutchins 1931) , sometimes taking over commercial companies, but more often mutual incorporations (Hutchins, Selby, and Voelker 1953) . In these instances, it is likely greater gains were garnered than in New Mexico. Whereas former acequia ditches were guided by the Law of the Indies to share shortages and surpluses -minimizing the common-pool externalities through collective action -the mutual ditches elsewhere exhibited more competition yielding greater opportunity for centralization to mitigate the common-pool losses. Alternatively, mutual ditch companies, already more market oriented than acequias, may be more prepared and apt to implement more efficient systems. These speculations, however, would require additional studies to substantiate. were particularly equipped to overcome free-riding issues to construct and maintain irrigation infrastructure through their quasi-government status, ability to tax, and ability to issue taxexempt bonds. And to this end, IDs were successful in New Mexico, particularly in Dona Ana.
When centralized IDs primarily altered the governance structure of existing decentralized communal irrigation systems and did not seek to substantially increase irrigated acreage, there is no evidence of improved irrigation and related agricultural outcomes. The results support the fact that not only are acequias among the types of common-arrangements that can avoid the falling prey to the tragedy of the commons over long time frames, but also that centralized governmental control does not necessarily improve upon the commons-arrangements.
While the well-established presence of acequias and only partial transition to IDs across the New Mexico lent itself well to answering how that change impacted the agricultural sector, the results and conclusions are also contextualized by this unique history. The results do add to the cannon of successful cases of common-property type arrangements working, but more analysis is needed to understand the factors in this and other cases that lead to relative efficient governance and why the move to IDs generally did not deliver significant gains. The results also enhance our understanding of how the development of various irrigation enterprises influence agricultural outcomes, but again, more work is needed to understand the impact of IDs more generally as well as the comparative performance of the more prevalent mutual irrigation companies for agricultural development and performance.
Last, the economic impacts should be considered in light of ecological and cultural impact.
As Crossland (1990) puts it, acequia users "interacted with arid lands instead of dominating them technologically" (p. 278). The summary of Taos County in the 1890 Census of Irrigation echoes this notion, saying the irrigation "is of the most primitive character," but also, that they are not often short of water because they "have learned to adapt their acreage to the probable 2 Acres are determined (and cross-referenced when possible) from multiple sources systematically favoring the source by order: (1930 Irrigation Census Schedules; Saavedra 1987; New Mexico 1969; BoR Project History Reports) and crossreferenced to those and others when possible (1950 Irrigation Census; 1912 -1914 1910 Irrigation Census) . Specific sources for both acreage and date are detailed in Tables A2 and A3. 3 Ditches to be included remained independent as of the 1930 Census, so treatment in analysis is from 1935 onward. 4 Carlsbad ID was formed in 1932 but the Bureau of Reclamation Project it tookover began in 1907, so treatment is as of 1910. *County in parentheses indicate inclusion based on 1910 borders, but not current borders.
( 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950 1900, 1910, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978 1900 , 1920 , and 1940 . Home value and rent are only available 1930 , 1940 , 1950 , 1959 . Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses Note: Coefficient estimates for a linear regression of (2). Column (1) is the main specification for reference. Columns (2)-(4) scale the number of district acres by various measures of land availability. Columns (5)-(7) reweight the census data in various ways. Column (5) keeps 1910 borders but includes only counties that did not subsequently change, only reweighting 1900 observations. Column (6) uses consistent 1920 county borders, only reweighting 1900 and 1910. Column (7) reweights all census data to 1978 county borders. Additional but unreported controls include number of creeks, population, latitude, longitude, I-25 indicator, railroad indicator, fraction over aquifer (interacted with post 1940), soil quality, ruggedness, elevation, and mean precipitation. Observations vary due to missing data in the census reports, with irrigation costs unreported past 1950 and and debt unreported past 1940. Robust standard errors, clustered by county, in parentheses
